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INTRODUCTION
I am honored to be invited to this discussion.
Our current inquiry about intervention must start with the global
community. It is a community in its comprehensive empirical, factual
linkages and intersecting processes among all states and peoples of
the world. We can only affirm that we are now living in McLuhan’s
Global Village of simultaneous communications and claims to
norms.1
This globalization is necessary context for familiar debates about
global governance, for example, whether state consent must serve as
its basis, or whether it can only be defined through a globally
centralized command structure, etc.
But other necessary questions from the global context also arise.
The intense actual and value linked processes defining the global
community present us, as McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman began
to discuss a half century ago, with the inescapable responsibility of
identifying the constitutive process of this community.2 That is, the
† Professor of Law, Beasley School of Law, Temple University. I appreciate
the excellent research assistance of Ms. Nicole Leach, JD expected 2015, and the
earlier background research of Ms. Laura Cook, JD 2013. All errors remain my
own.
1. See THOMAS R. MCFAUL, THE FUTURE OF PEACE AND JUSTICE IN THE
GLOBAL VILLAGE 3–14 (2006) (discussing McLuhan’s image of the “global
village” and the transforming effects of globalization).
2. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN
DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND
INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 72–77, 112–33 (2010) (discussing the increasingly
globalized nature of international affairs and constitutive structures for the
enforcement of international norms).
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flow of decisions, which establishes, maintains, adjusts, and changes
the institutions and procedures by which all other decisions are taken.
On this basis, actors in processes of more specific decisions allocate
basic values—such as power, wealth, rights, loyalties, and
authority—and the access to global resources.3
In this regard, in any human community, there is always
“governance,” though it may well rest on patterns of Hobbesian
banditry and Machiavellian contingency in unfamiliar, noninstitutionalized arrangements. As scholars, we have the
responsibility to identify and understand this global constitutive
process. And in exercising this responsibility, we confront a major
question about the current law of the global community, because
there will inevitably be Law in the sense of constitutive decisions as
noted above.
The major continuing question for international law in our
Global Village is whether, as a dynamic legal process of authority
and control, it will in its decisions, interpretations, and large range of
actors simply reflect the dominant patterns of power and control that
arise from unappraised sources in the Village. Or, whether its
decisions and interpretations will normatively aim to steadily shape a
better global community towards greater sharing of human values,
more protection of personal rights, less conflict, and more
cooperation towards human dignity. This jurisprudential question
continues today to be one of great tension and great camouflage.4
But this question underpins our discussion today on intervention
under international law: whether international law will simply bless
existing intervention patterns of global power and practice, unilateral
or collectively authorized, or whether as a legal system it will define
norms to meet the responsibility under Article 13(1) of the UN
Charter of fostering truly “the progressive development of
3. Id. at 112–13.
4. Competing jurisprudential and intellectual approaches proposing best ways
to understand international law and international relations reflect these tensions and
provide frameworks for much of the camouflage. How a jurisprudential school—
from positivism through realism, through natural law, through sociological realism,
through feminist jurisprudence, through critical race theory and TWAIL, through
constructivism—does or does not, for example, give authority and relevance to
evidence of human rights violations regarding Rights Accountability under
international law of states or private parties is only one of numerous possible
examples of such tension and camouflage.
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international law.”5
An inescapable inquiry arising from this constitutive question is
whether regarding intervention—however we define it—international
law has ceased to reflect and bless the raw patterns of power,
domination, subordination, and race that it did structure and bless for
some four centuries, prior to confirming the formal illegality of
European and other colonialism in the mid-twentieth century.
Anthony Anghie and other scholars have shown that colonial aims
and doctrines persist, to the point where current international law at
the constitutive level continues to be racialized as between Northern
Tier peoples and states pursuing various versions of an imperial
project, and racialized “other” peoples and states in the Southern
Tier, and also towards such diasporic peoples in the Northern Tier
within the North’s own territories and cities.6
Colonial conquest, its mobilization of law and institutions to
serve dominating policies, and its permitted military force to conquer
and induce Southern peoples and leaders under the tent of empires,
represent the first pertinent global model of intervention, a model of
manipulated and purposeful penetration of foreign peoples and their
cultures, backed by military force and rationalized subordination.
These were the global precedents and strategies that fixed the claims
to authority to intervene, as a global dynamic moving from the
Northern Tier to and against Southern peoples. Today, there is a
heavy burden on all who would argue that this colonial dynamic in
international law has become so neutralized and equitable as to no
longer shape meaningful North/South narratives and analysis about
authoritative interveners and strategies.
Further, in this necessarily contextual Introduction, the presence
or absence of international law is not a pertinent jurisprudential
question in critical discussions of intervention. As I noted, some
constitutive process of international law and governance—whether or
not in Westphalian form—will always exist in the Global Village.
5. U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1.
6. See ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 268–69 (2005) (arguing that non-Western countries are held
up to Western experiences and norms and then subjected to international law that
promotes and safeguards Western interests).
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Our question is: for what constitutive and policy ends is this law to be
shaped? Included here is the necessary question of how authority,
jurisprudence, and process are to be globally allocated, regarding
decisions and influence about the formation of international law on
intervention-related issues.7 Whoever controls or strongly affects the
jurisprudence of international law formation does so as well for the
major allocations of legal authority and justice in the Global Village,
including under progressive interpretations of the UN Charter.
Let us also note here that under the Charter the use of military
force is conventionally authorized only by Article 51 on self-defense,
and by the collective authority of the Security Council, the latter
being the principal legal avenue for many significant military
interventions. But we must also note the Charter’s reaffirmation of
the constitutive doctrine of sovereign equality of states, and its legal
significance for the decolonization movement, to be discussed
herein.8 We must further note, regarding state intentions at its San
Francisco negotiating conference, the opposition of Western states
led by the United States to making clear in its text that the Charter
outlawed colonialism and racism against colonized peoples, leaving
the confirmation of these prohibitions to emerge later under

7. An example here of this tension—and thus, certification of the importance
of the question—is the 60 year old contested global narrative generally between
Northern and Southern Hemispheric States on whether the UN General Assembly
through its resolutions should be understood as an arena for the formation of
international law. The narrative was framed by the newly-sovereign states from the
decolonization movement, which was quickly established in the 1960s as an
assembly voting majority dedicated to renovating post-colonial international law to
support, or at least not exclude, third and fourth world constitutive interests. See
Michael Barnett, The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical
Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 79, 84 (1995)
(discussing the UN’s decolonization agenda). Key early battles centered on
jurisdictional doctrines and the legal authority of the norm of Permanent
Sovereignty over National Resources and the Assembly’s subsequent Charter on
Economic Rights and Duties of States. See generally G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N.
Doc. A/1803(XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962); G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc.
A/3281(XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974). The obvious importance of the contested
jurisprudence around this narrative goes to, inter alia, whether Southern
Hemisphere States will have a pathway to leverage important contributions to the
formation of international law, as do Northern hemispheric States (especially the P5) through their control of the UN Security Council operating under Article 25 of
the Charter. Tensions around this narrative continue today in various forms.
8. See infra Parts II, III.
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international law.9 And finally, what homage should be paid the
Charter’s domestic jurisdiction clause, which was so abused by South
Africa to protect apartheid and by France to preserve colonial
dominion over Algeria, until better legal interpretation prevailed?10
Additionally, we note proposed Charter interpretations allowing
the unilateral use of force for “humanitarian intervention” as a
permissive principle of customary international law. This doctrinal
claim had both pre- and post-Charter history in supporting Northern
arguments to intervene in Southern States to rescue the former’s
citizens threatened there with harm. This doctrine has been much
abused, including in the definition of “citizens” expanding to
“European kith and kin” as empowering rescue interventions by any
European state, and incorporating the general practice of invoking the
doctrine for supposed rescue missions while the intervening troops,
once in country, tended to also modify the local governance of the
state more towards European interests.11 All in all, this history frames
9. HENRY J. RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTERESTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xxxiii, xxxviii–xl (2008).
10. South Africa’s consistent invocation of its freedom from international
scrutiny of apartheid in the 1950s and 1960s under the Charter’s domestic
jurisdiction provision is well known, as is the ultimate global community reactive
legal interpretation, which removed systematic violations of human rights from
matters essentially under a State’s domestic jurisdiction. See Kevin Hopkins,
Assessing the World's Response to Apartheid: A Historical Account of International
Law and Its Part in the South African Transformation, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 241, 250–54 (2002) (discussing South Africa’s attempts to evade
international pressure in regard to apartheid, and the UN’s, response). Perhaps less
well known is France’s attempt during the Algerian War to completely foreclose
the questions of both colonial conquest and domestic jurisdiction and international
scrutiny of its treatment of Algerians by amending its national constitution to make
Algerian a department and thus an integral part of its metropolitan territory. See
Cybelle H. McFadden, Franco-Algerian Transcultural Tension and National
Allegories, 74 S. ATLANTIC REV. 112, 114, 114 n.5 (2009) (discussing Algeria’s
unique colonial position as a department of France).
11. European interventions in the Congo (including re Katanga) and the 1986
U.S. intervention in Libya are two instances. See generally Janeen Klinger,
Stabilization Operations and Nation-Building: Lessons from United Nations
Peacekeeping in the Congo, 1960-1964, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 83, 87–93
(2005) (discussing the Congo Crisis and Belgium and the United Nations’
intervention in that country); Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of
Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L 177, 179–80,
189–92 (1987) (discussing the United States’ 1986 bombing campaign against
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a significant question on intervention. It concerns the conventional
interpretation of the Charter that it changed international law by
restricting the use of unilateral force only to self defense (now
including anticipatory self defense under Caroline Case limitations)
and the use of force otherwise only to Security Council
authorization.12 The question is, what, if any, acceptable international
legal and policy basis can be claimed to add additional permissions
under the Charter to legalize further unilateral state uses of military
force for any kind of intervention?
Lastly, we know that “intervention” is an ambiguous legal term.
Especially in the Global Village, there are many diplomatic,
ideological, cybertechnic, economic, para-military, and military
strategies of various intensities.13 Indeed, the very notion of
“intervention” calls for an interrogation of the authority and
sovereignty of the State beyond the limits of this Lecture. I will
discuss some of these intervention strategies, for example relating to
human rights, while others, such as Northern policies of nationbuilding and of premature recognition of governments, or nonmilitary violations of Article 2(4) of the Charter, will be omitted. And
I will discuss military intervention: when deployed it threatens the
widest range of immediate damage to human rights and values; but
occasionally, unfortunately, its proper deployment is necessary as an
initial strategy to prevent or mitigate an impending human
catastrophe. As will be discussed, the procedures, aims, and legal
authority for such deployment are as important as the military action
and its consequences.
From this Introduction, I will now briefly address the following
questions regarding intervention: the power of human rights;
American Interventions against Southern democracies and the

Libya, the international response to that bombing, and America’s claimed
justification of self-defense).
12. See John Moore, The Caroline, in 3 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2419, 2420–21 (1906); James Dever & John P. Dever Jr., Making Waves: Refitting
the Caroline Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165,
166–67 (2013).
13. See W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling
Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 794, 803–05 (1995) (discussing economic
sanctions and unilateral intervention as a tools to preserve vulnerable democracies).
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importance of the Nicaragua case;14 the critical importance of the
global decolonization movement, and its insufficiency to prevent the
march of colonial aims into post-colonial international law; counterterrorism, global policy, failed states, and intervention as claimed
self-defense; the UN Security Council as an international lawgiver,
the need to interrogate its decision process as a bulwark of Northern
racializing of law, and its authority over regional organizations; the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P);15 and a final proposal addressing the
issue of R2P and unilateral military intervention.
I.

THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The rise of international human rights law produced an
international legal obligation on states and others to protect the rights
of individuals amidst their conduct of international relations and
amidst their relations with their own people within their own
territories.16
For the first time, a duty on states emerged directly under
international law to protect individuals’ human rights, amidst even
the most intense state claims of traditional sovereign initiatives and
prerogatives. This duty supports, inter alia, a general international
obligation to look inside of each state regarding the protection of its
peoples’ rights, a duty for all states towards all peoples, and at a
minimum a duty to report and expose significant threats from that
host state to the rights of peoples within its borders.
But as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL
II) scholars note, this duty demands two further interrogations: (1) of
the authoritarian conditions within the post-colonial Northern and
Southern states; and (2) of the abuse by Northern states of this duty to
protect human rights abroad, by carrying forward proto-colonial
“civilizing” goals to “save” those peoples from themselves, even by
14. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
15. The emerging doctrine of R2P is more fully discussed herein in connection
with Security Council authority. See infra Part VI.
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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use of military force to intervene and control those governments.17
The principle of protecting individual human rights is now
obligatory. It must now be invoked by States and non-state actors in
a variety of situations. Thus, basic issues of human decency and harm
to persons must be addressed in the Global Village through all of its
intersecting value processes. Among the international actors
obligated to invoke the human rights protection of people in
particular situations are those states, the majority in the Northern Tier
which are most equipped to intervene in Southern States by
diplomatic, economic, ideological, and military means, and thus now
must at least be seen to implement their national policies under their
human rights obligations. Hence, this is the new power of human
rights regarding intervention in foreign (Southern) states.
II. AMERICAN INTERVENTIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN DEMOCRACIES
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NICARAGUA CASE
The sample of Iran, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Chile, and Grenada
represents democratically elected leaders militarily overthrown by the
United States and Northern Tier states because of the former’s
policies on protecting Northern foreign investment profits in their
countries and because of the perceived insufficiency of their
responses to U.S. cold war demands. These interventions confirmed
that Southern national democracy was no safeguard against U.S. and
Northern military intervention if Washington or its major corporate
clients disagreed with the content of Southern governments’ policies.
These Southern countries were racially “othered” beyond the
political commonality of democratic government and therefore
eligible for Northern interventionary control to select local Southern
leaders suitable to Northern leaders.
Thus the United States projected its domestic policies of
subordination of racial minorities abroad. At home, majority officials
and law enforcement agencies have consistently monitored minority
leadership, especially among African Americans, of their own groups
for majority-“approved” leaders, and discouraged, undermined, or
17. See Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to
International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 77, 83 (2003) (discussing TWAIL II scholarship’s criticism of
authoritarianism and emphasis on preserving the rights of Third World peoples).
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ejected all others, as well as opposed all processes seeking Black
autonomy in choosing Black leadership.
Inter-American reaffirmation of non-intervention doctrine, plus
Calvo Clause doctrine, plus the notion of economic aggression
emerged as inter-American counterclaims to hegemonic intervention,
plus mobilization of regional organizational (Organization of
American States) legal opposition to actions of U.S. hegemony
occurred during the twentieth century under the rise of regional nonintervention doctrine.18
The United States and former empire/hegemonic states,
including Russia, have persistently attempted to construct
international authority from International Relations theory: namely,
its support for the historical inevitability of the rise of hegemonic
states to fill vacuums in regional public order, which they argue and
demand should be supported by international law as beneficial to
global governance.19
A.

Nicaragua

It is appropriate now to address the 1984 International Court of
Justice (ICJ) contentious case of Nicaragua v. United States.20 The
18. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 707–08 (6th
ed. 2003); See David E. Graham, The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a
Contractual Renunciation of Diplomatic Protection, 6 TEX. INT’L L. F. 289, 289–94
(1971) (discussing the Calvo Clause and Latin American countries’ use of the
clause to limit intervention by other countries, including the United States);
Wenhua Shan, From “North-South Divide” to “Private Public Debate”: Revival of
the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law,
27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 631, 631–35 (2007) (discussing the history and
resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America); Martin Domb, Defining
Economic Aggression in International Law: The Possibility of Regional Action by
the Organization of American States, 11 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 85, 85–88 (1978)
(discussing the concept of economic aggression and several Latin American
countries’ attempt to prevent such aggression through the Organization of
American States).
19. ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); JEFFERY L. DUNOFF, INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
STATE OF THE ART (2013).
20. Nicaragua, supra note 14.
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case raises clear issues under classical non-intervention doctrine: the
unconsented hostile mining of Nicaragua’s harbor by American
covert forces; and the funding and command of proxy paramilitary
forces from El Salvador across Nicaraguan borders to oppose its
government. Our attention is drawn to, first, the international
relations context of this case, and second, to the theory under
customary law of the ICJ’s majority opinion which upheld the
continuing authority of the non-intervention doctrine under
international law.
On the first, with Nicaragua finding a treaty basis to establish
ICJ jurisdiction over the United States, notwithstanding U.S. counterstrategies aiming to avoid that result, by consenting to that
jurisdiction the Court put itself at a stark crossroads at that moment in
the international community. In facing the massive weight of the
United States in its undeclared war against Nicaragua on one side,
and the grounded claims of sovereign equality and authority of the
non-intervention doctrine by Nicaragua on the other, the ICJ in a
grand sense, through whatever its jurisprudence and best
interpretation of international law regarding liability between these
states, had to choose whether this case should be decided under
embedded propositions of international relations or under embedded
doctrines of international law. The international relations case would
stand on propositions embedded in the field’s general scholarship for
a few generations. Namely, that this was a clear case of a regional
hegemonic state moving through its own power, to impose regional
discipline under its own public order goals against smaller states in
its own, and globally acknowledged, regional “backyard” or “sphere
of influence.” The rise of this and other hegemonic states at various
points in history was necessary to prevent interstate conflict from
getting out of hand and to impose needed public order in various
parts of the globe. Thus, not only were there strong factual and
historical indicators that such hegemonic states periodically emerged
to exercise their hegemony, but there were normative perspectives
that argued such organizing and coercing of smaller states as
beneficial to the global good.
For the United States as an Inter-American hegemon, practices
of its exercising interventionary hegemony in the region for ensuring
“democracy” and prompt payment of debts stretched back to the first
half of the nineteenth century, and then forward in new definitions to
address its perceptions of a socialist government in Nicaragua. In
this regard, the international relations propositions pose the challenge
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to post-World War II, post-colonial international law of whether that
legal system must find some doctrine and interpretation among its
sources of authority to bless and legalize the policies and “discipline”
of the hegemonic state when it chooses to intervene in its own
backyard. Indeed, this was the basic argument of the United States in
this case, presented as an assertion of sovereign prerogative to
intervene regarding both its attempted manipulation of the ICJ’s
jurisdiction and its subsequent, futile attempt to absent itself from the
merits proceedings.21
But Nicaragua was standing on an ultimately different
foundation. It rested its case on the UN Charter-reaffirmed principle
of sovereign equality of states, historically a principle of both
international relations and international law, and on the doctrine of
non-intervention as not only reaffirmed in the UN Charter, but
finding strong underpinnings and legal expressions arising from
Inter-American states in response to the same hegemonic activities of
the United States during the previous and present centuries.22
Reinforced by treaty and regional organization findings and
declarations in the name of the Americas, the doctrine of nonintervention in its military expression existed as a living bundle of
expectations under both regional and general international law, and
particularly for small states, notwithstanding that they could only
rarely oppose such US military action when it occurred.
Thus, the ICJ faced, as a court of law but functioning in the
actual world, the decision of whether this case was to be decided
under international relations (although cloaked in legalisms), or under
international law. And as we know, it decided upon the latter, thus
21. Id. at 32; United States: Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the
Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, 24 INT’L
LEGAL MATERIALS 246, 246 (1985) [hereinafter Statement on the U.S.
Withdrawal].
22. See generally Charter of the Organization of American States art. 2, para.
b, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. Indeed the decision by Nicaragua
to sue the United States for illegal intervention in 1984 is an expression of the same
inter-American opposition to American intervention. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Reports of Judgments,
Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1984 I.C.J. 169, ¶ 32 (May 10) (discussing
Nicaragua’s claims based on its sovereignty, non-intervention, and the right of selfdetermination, among others).
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incurring the immediate enmity of the legally thwarted United
States.23 The notion that, when international relations clashes with
international law on questions of intervention, international law
should prevail, has clear ramifications for the authority of nonintervention doctrine in the Global Village.
Further, the Court’s holding on non-intervention and customary
law was, in a different way, equally significant.
We see that the International Court of Justice here handed down
a major decision against hegemonic subordination of small, regional,
“other” states and peoples, against the U.S. military intervention in
Nicaragua. Its holding on international law formation was favorable
to the South: the norm of non-intervention remains good law with
only general state practice because of community opinio juris.24
Thus, the notion of the violation of the non-intervention norm was
preserved, and applied against U.S. military action against Nicaragua.
The Court, faced with a choice of the claimed international relations
authority to intervene of a hegemonic state, and the international
legal authority of the non-intervention norm as well as the norm of
sovereign equality of states, by legal reasoning which accepted the
customary law challenge, chose to determine U.S. liability under
international law. The subsequent anger of the United States and its
two-year campaign against the Court certified the importance of the
Nicaragua case.25
III. THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE GLOBAL DECOLONIZATION
MOVEMENT AND ITS INSUFFICIENCY TO PREVENT THE MARCH OF
COLONIAL AIMS INTO POST-COLONIAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
This historic Decolonization Movement, coalescing in the 1950s
23. See Theodore M. Lieverman, Law and Power: Some Reflections on
Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 10 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE
295, 298 n.16 (1986) (discussing the United States’ Security Council veto of
Nicaragua’s attempt to enforce the ICJ judgment); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr.,
Nicaragua v. United States as a Precedent, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 652, 656–57 (1985)
(noting that the United States attempted to limit the jurisdictional reach of the ICJ
under different treaties).
24. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 18.
25. Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal, supra note 21, at 246–49 (arguing that
the Court’s finding of jurisdiction over the matter is “contrary to law and fact” and
that a judicial tribunal with questionable impartiality is not the proper venue to
resolve the US-Nicaragua conflict).
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through the 1970s, changed global politics and international law by
adding some 140 sovereign states to the international community. It
further revised the politics and authority of the United Nations and
other international organizations. In its early post-colonial years, it
mounted a formidable challenge through the UN General Assembly
to Northern normative, legal, and economic dominance of the Global
Village.26 It reaffirmed the need to revise the international legal
system and its jurisprudence towards the equitable participation of
smaller states and Southern peoples of color, and it invigorated
notions of sovereign accountability under international law.
Further, the Decolonization Movement challenged Northern
control and domination of the processes of international law
formation, including through the UN General Assembly, the
Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,27 and
the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States,28 plus the
rise of a body of Southern Tier-oriented international legal
scholarship.
The Movement represented a convergence of the newly
confirmed jus cogens right of self-determination of peoples, and the
doctrine of sovereign equality of states, which had to be applied to all
of these new states under the UN Charter. This convergence, a
principal outcome of decolonization, formed the refutation of rights
claimed by ex-colonial metropolitans and other Northern states to
26. See NASSAU A. ADAMS, WORLDS APART: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE AND
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 53–55 (1993) (discussing the growing influence of
post-colonial countries in the General Assembly during the 1950s).
27. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803(VXII) (Dec. 14, 1962).
28. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 8281 (XXIX),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281(XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974) (declaring that every State has
the right to “regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment . . . in
accordance with national objectives and priorities. No state shall be compelled to
grant preferential treatment to foreign investment.”); see also Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV)
U.N. Doc. A/Res/1514(XV) (Dec. 14, 1960) (“Immediate steps shall be taken, in
Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet
attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories,
without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed
will and desire . . . .”).
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continue to intervene in their former colonies by economic and
military strategies.
But then came the Northern counter-attack to regain
jurisprudential and organizational dominance in the Global Village.
Economic strategies against smaller states were coupled with periodic
military interventions, such as the periodic French incursions in
French West Africa and the US intervention in Vietnam under the
thin guise of the doctrine of collective self-defense (on which the
Nicaragua case subsequently put important limits).29 In this period
also arose the general Northern Tier aim to escape international legal
accountability for the racial, economic, and cultural abuses of
colonialism and apartheid, and, where possible, to shift any such
liability to Southern States by holding them strictly responsible for all
events and misgovernance within their borders, no matter what their
origins.
In this connection, there was the notable refusal of Northern
Governments to significantly intervene in the South African apartheid
state and to make it impossible for the UN Security Council to do
so.30 This Northern refusal to “other” the apartheid state and thus
privilege its claimed cold war interests to cooperate with Pretoria
represented a privileging of Northern racial solidarity with white
South Africa against its Black majority, and implicitly against all
African heritage peoples in the Global Village. In the United States, it
took the historic African American-led anti-apartheid movement to
change U.S. foreign policy to more support the South African antiapartheid struggle.31 Gernot Kohler’s important jurisprudential
proposal—that law and law making in the entire Global Village could
accurately be reflected as a mirror of South African apartheid—was a
direct reflection of the inability of most Northern scholars to
acknowledge race as a moving force in international relations, even

29. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 32.
30. See S.C. Res. 581, U.N. Doc. S/RES/581 (Feb. 13, 1986) (condemning the
apartheid state, but not taking significant steps to intervene). Indeed during the
1980s, notwithstanding wide international pressure on States to levy economic
sanctions on South African apartheid government, the UN Security Council was
only able to enact a single arm embargo against apartheid South Africa in 1977.
S.C. Res. 418, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977).
31. Henry J. Richardson III, Reverend Leon Sullivan's Principles, Race, and
International Law: A Comment, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 55, 67–69 (2001).
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given the brutal clarity of apartheid.32 It was further a reflection of
the reasons and consequences of a pattern of confirmed Northern
decisions to refuse to intervene in apartheid South Africa, while
being quite willing to do so elsewhere in the Southern Tier, and being
quite willing to do so, using heavy economic strategies, upon the
advent of post-apartheid South Africa in 1994.33
Thus, the Global Village saw the continuation in modern
international law of old Northern colonial doctrines: to make political
concessions on forms of Southern state independence, while
continuing economic and periodic military intervention strategies,
and arguing their legality so as to leverage Southern states from
within their national territories and within their governments for the
benefit of Northern interests.
IV. COUNTER-TERRORISM GLOBAL POLICY, FAILED STATES,
INTERVENTION AS CLAIMED SELF-DEFENSE

AND

There appears to be a current U.S. policy of mobilizing all
national African militaries, plus African Union (AU) regional
authorized forces, to U.S. counter-terrorism aims.34 This is a new
kind of great power intervention, with induced consent of Southern
states, under potential self-defense claims that descend on thin
grounds from the Global Village’s post-9/11 gift to the United States
of a valid self-defense claim in inaugurating the Afghanistan war, a
gift subsequently undermined by the 2003 Iraq invasion. Thus, issues
of whether counter-terrorism overseas military strategies rest on
“self-defense” or “police enforcement” rationales may be somewhat
beside the point. Both seem to lead to attempts to legalize foreign
Northern pre-emptive military interventions into the South, while
failing so far to halt the now-dispersed threat of global terrorism as

32. See Gernot Kohler, The Three Meanings of Global Apartheid: Empirical,
Normative, Existential, 20 ALTERNATIVES 403, 403–05 (1995) (discussing the
impact of race in our society).
33. Hopkins, supra note 10, at 250; African National Congress [ANC],
Economic Transformation, 53d Nat’l Conference Resolutions, ANC Decl. 3 at 20
(Dec. 16–20, 2012).
34. See generally AFRICOM, THE REPORTER , no. 4, 2011 at 193 (describing
the role of Air Force Judge Advocates in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in
Africa).
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attacks on innocent civilians.35
Further, there is the closely related question of whether unilateral
interventions into “failed states” will be legalized, as interventions
into the “renamed racial others.” Ruth Gordon has discussed the early
twenty-first century proposed and demanded revitalization of the UN
Trusteeship Council to be the global legal repository of desovereigntized “failed states,” plus the demand to resolve the
transitional international legal questions to make this happen, as “The
Ultimate Intervention.”36 However, international legal doctrine,
despite many Northern scholarly proposals that it as a legal system
should do so, and despite disputed arguments that U.S. counterterrorism policy may validly claim prerogatives of military
intervention into failed states to preempt sources of terrorist threats,
has not incorporated these demands and policy goals. It has
particularly refused to incorporate a formally reduced standard of
sovereignty for “failed states” that would permit greater military
intervention into their territories under any notion of reduced
sovereignty. The International Court of Justice made this clear in its
holding in the Congo v. Uganda37 case regarding Uganda’s lack of
special cross-border interventionary prerogatives into the Congo,
notwithstanding the latter’s indexed status as a failed state.38 In the
same vein, other judicial holdings have refused to lower the threshold
of state responsibility. For example, Somalia as a failed state did not
mitigate foreign criminal penalties for pirates sailing from its
territory.39

35. See Bill Briggs, Study: US Drone Strikes More Likely to Kill Civilians
Than US Jet Fire, NBC NEWS (July 2, 2013, 8:34 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/
investigations/study-us-drone-strikes-more-likely-kill-civilians-us-jet-v19254842
(discussing the impact of airstrikes for counterterrorism purposes).
36. Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903, 904–07 (1997).
37. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19).
38. Id. ¶ 259.
39. "[P]iracy should never be the solution to a people operating in a failed state
as it inflicts and continues to inflict pain and suffering onto humanity in different
ways, a fact of which the accused are well aware.” R v Ise (2011) SLR 220 at ¶3
(Syc.). We may interpret this part of the holding further as prohibiting the use or
support by a failed (African) state of piracy and its activities because of their harm
to humanity, under historically grounded law, and thus its citizens can claim no
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This international legal refusal to diminish the sovereignty of
“failed states” in the face of heavy Northern official and scholarly
demands that they be subject to forms of preemptive intervention, not
limited by requirements to find “imminent danger’ to invading states,
represents the more desirable legal policy. It holds the line against
further racializing of international legal approaches to failed states,
when the very concept represents great racializing. And in doing so,
as Jeremy Levitt discusses, it preserves space for the continued
evolution of regional doctrines of obligations to assist failed states to
resolve their problems, while prescribing obligations and rights
protecting peoples within those states.40 Such examples arise in
Africa under the African Union Treaty prescribing rights of
democratic governance, of freedom from military coups, and rights to
remedial regional assistance.41 Regional policies are prescribed of
assistance for “collapsed states,” plus regional approval and
authorization of military intervention into regional situations of
human rights catastrophe, such as Nigeria into Sierra Leone and
Liberia under the Economic Community of West African States

defense or mitigation for such activities, no matter what their personal or needful
circumstances. There is no ‘failed state’ privilege to impose piracy costs on the
international community. The Court’s holding continued, and directly implied that
the Seychelles as a sovereign state may exercise its protective jurisdiction against
such threatening actions in the Indian Ocean to protect its vital interests, as it is
doing here. Citizens of ‘failed states’ have no grounds for, nor do they deserve a
waiver of liability when acts from their territory create a threat to other states. By
the Court upholding criminal sentences beyond the minimum all around in this
case, it implicitly held that African ‘failed states’ retain full sovereign
responsibility for actions emanating from their territory, and their citizens, no
matter their personal hardships, retain full international criminal liability for their
actions, especially as these personal and territorial actions are shown to threaten the
vital interests of a neighboring state.
40. See JEREMY I. LEVITT, ILLEGAL PEACE IN AFRICA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LEGALITY OF POWER SHARING WITH WARLORDS, REBELS, AND JUNTA 145–48
(2012) (discussing the UN Charter’s recognition of broad rights and protections,
including self-determination, and how certain power agreements in Africa have so
far failed to meet these standards).
41. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance art. 4–5, 23–24,
Jan. 30, 2007, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_CHARTER_ON_
DEMOCRACY_ELECTIONS_AND_GOVERNANCE.pdf.
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(ECOWAS) Treaty.42
V. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AS AN INTERNATIONAL LAWGIVER:
THE NEED TO INTERROGATE ITS DECISION PROCESS AS A
BULWARK OF NORTHERN RACIAL AUTHORITY
Much current scholarship on the legality of the use of force to
intervene in states where human rights are threatened, where
international crimes are being committed, or to bring “democracy”
for wider regional or geopolitical purposes, is focused on the UN
Security Council, as both a law-giver and as the preferred legal arena
for these proposed actions.43 Many interim issues are raised,
including threatened Council inaction in the face of widely agreed
and credibly documented international crimes, for example Syria, and
chemical weapons, and thousands of deaths, but for the moment let
us put them aside.
The point is that the argued heightened legal necessity of
Security Council approval throws an intense spotlight on the need for
a new normative assessment of Security Council decision making,
beyond an analysis of its Charter and other authority, as essential to
understanding current military interventions under international law.
This need is framed, on the one hand, by the asserted role of the
Council as the chief custodian of collective authority under
international law and the most desirable source of legal permission to
use force, and on the other hand, by the total lack of global
momentum towards any Security Council reform that would revise
the procedures by which it as a Charter body decides to allocate
authority to member states and prescribe interpretations of
international law. We are left, therefore, with the current narratives of
Council decision making, especially under Chapter VII authority, that
feature a domination/subordination two tier system of P-5
collaboration and debates to resolve veto/abstention questions in that
group, from which the rotating Council members are generally
excluded. There follows the polling and assembling of a Council
voting majority which often features applications of varying
42. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States art. 58, May,
28, 1975, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/?id=treaty&lang=en.
43. See generally Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary
Security Threats: Old Medicine for New Ills? 59 STAN. L. REV. 415, 419–20 (2006)
(arguing that the UN Security Council is well-suited to address modern
international threats of force).
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pressures by individual or several P-5 members on smaller, more
vulnerable rotating members to construct a voting majority for the
proposed Council decision.44
I suggest that this decision narrative can no longer be accepted
as a legally permissible and excusable exercise of Northern sovereign
autonomy and cross-pressures within the Council arena. This
narrative falls under the classic Groatian axiom that we must not fail
to normatively assess every significant act of international relations.
In assessing the Council’s decision process, we note certain
continuing issues. We note the original Charter intent that the P-5,
emerging as governmental directors of the world community out of
World War II and also as declining metropolitans of threatened
empires, would cast their Council vetoes only on the sincere belief
that a particular resolution would significantly imperil the global
community welfare.45 We do so, only to then note that fairly early on,
this hope and the original Charter intent was dashed, first by the
Soviet Union and soon after by the United States, by establishing
precedents in which vetoes were cast to do nothing more than protect
their exclusive foreign policy interests and allies.
As Kenneth Roth recently observed regarding Syria, “One
frustrating element of the Security Council’s structure is that it
permits the Five Permanent Members to use their vetoes to block
action for any reason, partisan or parochial, even in the case of mass
atrocities.”46 And thus there subsequently arise short-lived debates
about whether the use of the veto can be limited under the law of the
Charter, ending in negative futility from P-5 refusals and barriers. For
example, recently in the current UN narrative refining the R2P
principle, the Secretary-General urged the P-5 to publicly and
44. Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 27, 53, 55 (2003).
45. 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 927–933
(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).
46. Kenneth Roth, Syria: What Chance to Stop the Slaughter?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS,
Nov.
21,
2013,
available
at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013
/nov/21/syria-what-chance-stop-slaughter/.
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voluntarily commit to refrain from casting vetoes of any Chapter VII
resolution authorizing R2P intervention for credible, well-grounded
reasons.47 That recommendation is still pending.48
A second continuing issue is that of the limits of Security
Council legal authority. We are all familiar with the Lockerbie
Case,49 which gave the ICJ the opportunity to rule on this issue,
which it promptly deflected.50 A longer strand of argument holds that
Council authority is necessarily limited by the Charter Articles 1 and
2, Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. This argument has
never been either refuted or confirmed, due to the wide constitutive
text of those Articles, as well as the proposition that while the
argument could be ultimately valid, the Council has not yet been
perceived to act at the limits of whatever authority Articles 1 & 2
might represent. More might be done on this question, given the right
opportunity, for a Southern Tier actor (most likely) to actually and
concretely frame an argument of Council ultra vires by action or
inaction in a particular situation violating Articles 1 & 2, but this has
not yet happened.
But these issues do not comprise a normative assessment of the
Council’s decision making in exercising collective authority to
authorize R2P or other military intervention, in particular states,
which are most likely located in the Southern Tier. We must focus on
the question of the corruption of the Council by either the P-5
collectively or by the United States as the sole great power in alliance
with other P-5 members. That question goes to whether the Council’s
decision making is so dominated by any or all of the P-5 that
significant decisions, especially under Chapter VII, can best be
47. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep.
of the Secretary-General, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
48. U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Secretary-General, July 25, 2012, U.N. Doc
A/66/874-S/2012/578; GAOR, 66th Sess., (2012)
49. “On December 21, 1988, Pan American Flight 103, on its way to New
York's John F. Kennedy Airport, exploded over Lockerbie, a town in southern
Scotland. All 259 passengers on board were killed. Eleven Lockerbie residents also
were killed as the shattered civilian carrier crashed to the ground.” Scott S. Evans,
The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism, Judicial Review and
the Political Question Doctrine, 18 MD. J. INT’L. L. & TRADE 21, 27 (1994)
(footnotes omitted).
50. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.),
Provisional Measure, 1992 I.C.J. 114, 127 (Apr. 14).
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understood as consistently implementing the national foreign policy
and security goals of one or more P-5 Members, using international
law under the Charter as its vehicle, and not as the exercise of lawful
global collective authority to use force within the world community.
The collective P-5 drive to intervene in the Southern Tier, through the
vehicle of international law and the Charter, has seemingly become
so determined and intense that it overwhelms the normal issues about
the interplay of P-5 foreign policy and the obligations of each such
country in the Council.
The corruption here is of the very notion of collective authority
under modern international law. The masquerade of national power
and aims being cloaked by the forms of collective decision making,
to reach public conclusions of legality of military and other strategies
against target states, only reaffirms the corruption. Such corruption
destroys this vital global safeguard against arbitrary military force.
Notions of collective authority were evolved over more than a
century to create such safeguards and to further guard against
international legal prescription governing critical values being
corrupted at the core of the authorizing process by the cloaked aims
of unilateral national power.51
Further, this corruption raises even more profound questions. As
the Council is corrupted by P-5 foreign policy aims, we must know
that those aims cannot be understood apart from the following: these
states’ active shaping of the legal history of international law, the
global North/South domination/subordination narrative, and the
continuing narratives of colonialist and neo-colonial aims and
policies being extended from the era of legal colonialism by policies
and actions of the same now ex-metropolitan states towards the same
territories of their ex-colonies and subordinated peoples. Further, they
cannot be understood apart from continuing aims to extend control
under international law from the North into the South to not only
protect foreign investments, secure resources for their national needs,
and protect their exclusive security claims. Equally, the North uses
that lawful control to deflect accountability for global problems,
inequities, and crimes from North to South, and to generally block
51. See generally JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS
LAW-MAKERS (2005) (discussing the evolution of international organizations and
the treaty making process).
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that accountability from being returned to the North.
Their foreign policy aims in the Council cannot be understood
apart from their roles in the rise of international human rights law,
from their early, commendable (if cold-war laced), general fostering
of states’ obligations to protect and extend the growing list of
international human rights of individual persons, to their retreat in
suspicion and paranoia—factual, doctrinal, and theoretical—from the
effective enforcement of these rights in their own and other
jurisdictions as they collided with their national prerogatives and
traditions of “othering” foreign peoples. Moreover, this corruption is
not addressed by proposals for Security Council procedural reforms
towards a duty to decide or explain, such as those made by Professor
Spain, though such reforms might provide more grounds for Council
ultra vires issues under the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.52
Permanent Members’ Council aims cannot be understood apart
from their behaviors and public perspectives attempting to use the
human rights process to continue the Northern colonial civilizing
mission towards Southern peoples, as shown by Makau Mutua,53 by
favoring doctrines and interpretations urging those peoples to be
ashamed of their own cultures in favor of neo-liberal principles
friendly to foreign investment being labeled as “democracy,” and by
finding jurisprudential excuses to undermine the legal authority of
essential economic, social, and cultural rights.54 They cannot be
understood apart from their general opposition to obligations of
reparations for past colonial and racial wrongs to oppressed southern
peoples, which were so clearly sponsored, financed, and largely
implemented by Northern metropolitans, beginning with the

52. Anna Spain, The U.N. Security Council's Duty to Decide, 4 HARV. NAT'L
SEC. J. 320, 320 (2013).
53. See Makau Mutua, The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALISM 51, 61 (András
Sajó ed., 2004) (“International human rights fall within the historical continuum of
the European colonial project in which whites pose as the saviors of a benighted
and savage non-European world.”).
54. Henry Richardson III, Patrolling the Resource Transfer Frontier:
Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court’s Contributions to
International Justice, 9 AFR. STUD. Q., Fall 2007, at 81, 82–83 (discussing the
South African Court's response to dominant Northern Tier limiting interpretations
of economic human rights.).
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international slave trade.55
These aims, finally, cannot be understood apart from the
international legal history of permissible doctrines of diplomatic,
ideological, economic, and military intervention, from legal
colonialism forward, being evolved to legalize the coercion of
Southern Tier political cooperation and their resources, plus to force
their recognition of Northern hegemonic authority, and the
superiority of Northern sovereign state authority over Southern
sovereign state authority. And not only is the Council’s collective
authority used to certify the legality of Northern jus ad bellum
intervention actions, but also often after the fact to certify the jus in
bello legalities of the same actions as they move into a later stage.
The latter occurs even when the Council manages, by a P-5 split, to
retain and exercise truly collective authority to refuse to authorize a
clearly illegal intervention, such as the 2003 invasion and conquest
by the United States of Iraq that was refused under Resolution
1441.56 There, a basic question was whether the United States was
guilty of the crime of aggressive war and colonial conquest.57
Security Council resolutions beginning almost immediately after the
invasion constructed a fig-leaf for the United States against such
crimes by, in its quasi-judicial role, finding that Iraq retained its
sovereignty and was not reduced to a colony, notwithstanding the
total destruction of its government by the United States, the complete
military occupation of its entire territory, and the U.S. construction of
several years of occupation regimes synonymous with American
goals and policies.58
So, if the Security Council is corrupted at the very heart of its
collective authority under the Charter by the domination aims of its
55. See 14 Caribbean Nations Sue European Countries for Slavery
Reparations,
AL
JAZEERA
A M.
(Sept.
27,
2013,
7:42
PM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/20
13/9/27/14-caribbean-nationssueeuropeancountriesforreparationsoverslaver.html
(describing Caribbean nations’ recent lawsuit seeking reparations from European
powers for their role in the Atlantic slave trade).
56. Richardson, supra note 44, at 53.
57. Id. at 65
58. 104 AISL Porc. 214 (2011). S.C. Res. 1511, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511
(Oct. 16, 2003).
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Permanent Members, we must consider alternatives for governing the
legality of military intervention, particularly as such intervention
tends to be planned and launched in the North and targeted,
implemented, and pushed towards Northern- approved consequences
in the South. Even if we have no immediate formal constitutive
alternative to the Council under the Charter, we must consider, even
if only to accurately assess the costs, whether it is wise and equitable
policy in the progressive development of international law to
continue to funnel collective authority decisions about such
interventions through this body, especially under those conditions of
greatest potential human rights tragedy and need.
It might be the better global policy to, first, continue present
trends of interpretation under Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter to
widen the competence of regional organizations vis-a-vis the Security
Council to authorize peacekeeping and other humanitarian operations
for assisting regional states and peoples.59 And second, to now adjust
59. Articles 52 and 53 of the U.N. Charter state:
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 2. The
Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting
such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
before referring them to the Security Council. 3. The Security Council shall
encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of
the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. 4. This Article
in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.
U.N. Charter art. 52.
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception
of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article,
provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed
against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such
time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be
charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a
state. 2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to
any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any
signatory of the present Charter.
U.N. Charter art. 53; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
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the legal balance between the Council and regional organizations on
authorizing “enforcement actions” under Article 53, towards
confirming regional authority to initially authorize such actions,
particularly in providing needed emergency responses to imminent
human rights catastrophes in a regional state, whether or not such
response is invited by that government. In practice, except for
Kosovo, there has been either ex ante or post hoc Security Council
action that implied approval for such regional interventions, even
regarding the ECOWAS intervention led by Nigeria into Liberia and
Sierra Leone.60 However, an African Union Treaty provision (Article
4(h) of the Constitutive Act) seems to enable the African Union to
authorize enforcement actions independently of the Security
Council.61 Its enactment can be understood as a direct response to UN
inaction on the Rwanda genocide.62
For emergency responses to impending human rights
catastrophes, Article 53 needs to be interpreted towards the legality
of such operations, especially where the Security Council has not or
cannot act timely. As we see, the policy aim of giving the Council the
sole Charter competence to authorize enforcement actions in the
world community vis-a-vis regional organizations, a debate which
arose in the San Francisco Conference, is now, due to the corruption
of the Council, increasingly a problem. Not only do P-5 veto battles
often prevent the Council from making timely authorizing decisions
in urgent situations, but the racialized biases that the Permanent
Members bring to questions of intervention in the Southern Tier risk
insufficient strategies and neo-colonial responses when the Council
does exercise collective authority. One possible interpretative remedy
would be to confirm the initial competence of regional organizations
to authorize enforcement actions in regional situations of imminent
human rights catastrophe, under a presumption of Council approval
of such emergency actions, even if the regional organization thus
shares with the Council the authority to infringe Article 2(4) of the

COMMENTARY, supra note 45, at 1496–1505.
60. Id. at 1487–90.
61. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), Jul. 11, 2000, 2158
U.N.T.S. 3.
62. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45,
at 1490–93.
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Charter.63 The burden would then be on the Council and the P-5 to
subsequently disown the regional action.
We must further consider whether it is the best international
legal policy to continue the evolution of R2P as a legal doctrine
through invocations and implementation through the Security
Council, following its first invocation in the Libyan situation.64 Or,
whether R2P should desirably continue to evolve through regional
organizational decision-making as the overall less-corrupt sources of
collective authority. The corruption of the Security Council makes it
impossible to wait for effective and just Security Council reform in
order to interpret international law to implement more just and
equitable actions of military intervention into the Southern Tier.
Other sources of collective authority, which promise better
safeguards against dominating and racializing national state behavior
relative to decisions about military intervention, must be found.
VI. R2P
This now brings us to the bundle of issues and emerging norms
known as Responsibility to Protect (R2P), already mentioned. As an
emerging legal norm of permissibility for outside states to intervene
in a state in the midst of or imminently facing tragic violations of the
human rights of its citizens, under collective authority or unilateral
obligation, there is much confusion here. And we must note that R2P
comprises claims and expectations that Northern Tier states will
generally, even if not exclusively, be intervening in Southern Tier
states under the rubric of preventing human rights tragedies. There
are no expectations that, for example, Nigeria will be intervening in
Spain under African Union authority or unilaterally to prevent major
rights crimes towards the Basque people, or that the United States
will be intervening in Australia to remedy racial tragedies against
Aboriginal peoples.
That Northern states generally have superior resources to project
military force in the implementation of global authority compared to
Southern states only sharpens, without resolving, R2P issues. It
cannot be a prong of neutral analysis, particularly when this capacity
is linked with Northern Tier control or near control over key
international organizational processes and decisions authorizing the
63. Id. at 1500–05.
64. Id. at 1489–90.
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lawful use of force, beginning with the UN Security Council. Thus,
R2P risks providing another doctrinal framework for the North to
leverage and control decisions about using force or other coercion to
enforce human rights law, and then to exercise additional leverage to
secure what Southern agreement is possible in order to claim global
legitimacy. This risk must be compared to the goal of the Northern
and Southern Tier evolving to share equal authority to determine
lawful use of force in particular situations, whether in Northern or
Southern States, and to determine liability for such human rights
violations.
We must also step back and understand the R2P doctrine as an
historical successor to the old doctrine of humanitarian intervention:
quite possibly another North to South projection of international legal
authority. It comprises legal permission to intervene to rescue and
protect local endangered persons.65 However, there is a doctrinal
distinction. R2P is grounded on the rights of people to be protected
from human rights tragedy, while the old abused humanitarian
intervention was grounded on one state’s right to intervene in
another.66 We do not yet know if the North/South R2P consequences
will be more globally equitable, and the recent Libyan situation
through the Security Council invoking R2P is not encouraging.67
Regarding humanitarian intervention, we should briefly recall
various claims about its legality under the UN Charter, because
similar issues must be resolved about the use of at least unilateral
military force under R2P, also under the Charter. Proponents of
humanitarian intervention argued it as a doctrine of customary
international law, which the Charter did not abrogate—a customary
river running beneath the Charter, as indeed the ICJ holding in
65. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep.
of the Secretary General, ¶ 11(c), U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
66. Id. ¶ 7.
67. The Security Council authorized military action by States, which just
happen to be ex-colonial states of Libya prior to its independence, and pursuant to
the beginning of military conflict ignored all Africa attempts to find a more
peaceful ending to the conflict. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, at 4
(Mar. 17, 2011). And, there has been a decided lack of success in applying the
same R2P principles to the massive deaths and oppression by Syrian government
against its people. See David Rieff, Op-Ed., R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all.
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Nicaragua v. U.S. permits.68 Specifically, unilateral humanitarian
intervention represented a use of nonconsensual military force
intervening in a target state.69 Let us recall the Charter goals to
change international law to limit permissible uses of force by a state
to (1) use in self defense under Article 51, which does to a degree
incorporate self defense custom as well as anticipatory self defense
with the limits of the Caroline case, but not pre-emptive self-defense,
and (2) that military force authorized by Security Council decision.
The Charter aim was to abolish war as authorization for military
force and channel unilateral permissibility into a single (widening)
grant of international constitutive authority. Unilateral force
otherwise was to be illegal, including under Article 2(4) for violating
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, contrary to
UN Purposes and Principles.70
The issue becomes whether and on what legal basis can we add
R2P as a unilateral, or non-Security Council-authorized use of force,
as a new and additional permission under the Charter, not amounting
to self defense, to use unilateral force within a foreign sovereign
state. The customary law argument for R2P does not apply, at least
not yet, and not without more clarified evidence of a global
consensus. Is it wise to then claim that a second, newer customary
river permitting unilateral force runs beneath the Charter, thus
opening the door to defining a third and fourth such rivers? This
threatens to become a recipe for expanding the permissibility for
national state military force to pre-Charter levels addressing mere
foreign policy objectives. It would compromise the foundational aim
of international law to reduce military conflict both among and within
states. And given that the majority of the 30 or so states which have
effective capacities to project military force well beyond their borders
lie in the Northern Tier, this is a recipe for expanding permissible
Northern intervention into and onto Southern peoples.
Taking a moment to reflect on the above, let me address Rwanda
in the ambiguous R2P narrative.
68. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 94–95.
69. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM.
J. INT’L. L. 107, 111 (2006).
70. DANISH INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: LEGAL
AND
POLITICAL
ASPECTS
81
(1999),
available
at
http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publ
ications/Andet/Humanitarian_Intervention_1999.pdf.
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Rwanda

A proposed doctrine of R2P rose into international community
expectations following the Rwanda genocide. The failure of the
Arusha Accords in 1992-93, leading to that tragedy, relative to the
collectively authorized peacekeeping effort by the UN Security
Council, demonstrates that the opportunity of existing UN
peacekeeping military forces in Rwanda, to halt or mitigate the
predicted, oncoming, planned, and directed genocide, was not taken
because of the European (Belgian) and Security Council P-5-imposed
great reduction of those forces, to the point of ineffectiveness.71 Thus,
Rwanda shows that if Security Council-authorized collective
authority is the preferred legal mode of implementation of R2P,
moving as it would from North to South, the Council cannot be
depended on to overcome the foreign policy interests (led by the
United States) of the P-5 and enable itself as a law-giver to
effectively decide on sufficiently strong and timely military force
(here largely already in the country) to halt a planned and directed
genocide. The Council’s response was indeed to weaken such forces
and make it clear that they were not to interfere. A stronger force
deployed could have mitigated or prevented the killing of up to 1
million civilians.
This failure of the Northern-controlled response to this genocide,
in the Council as the arena of Northern decisional and international
legal preference, indicates, first, that the P-5 retain the deficits within
the Council of racialized international law towards the Southern Tier,
notwithstanding the most serious crimes converging with Northern
availability of military capacity. Second, it indicates that this P-5/UN
failure in the quintessential R2P situation frames anew the issue of
the legality of unilateral intervention in an imminent danger R2P
situation. This is particularly so, since the P-5/UN response in
Rwanda, at the critical point, arguably violated the Purposes and
Principles of the UN Charter by deliberately neutering the Council
and allowing a predicted genocide.

71. U.N. S.C. Rep. of Secretary-General, July 4, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/64/864
GAOR, 64th Sess. (2010); U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Dec. 15, 1999
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 37,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999).
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Thus, this history challenges the asserted policy preference of
the Council as the primary R2P lawgiver regarding collective
authority to protect people facing human rights catastrophes. The
challenge is not resolved by the Libyan action based on the Council’s
interpretation of R2P, because clearly the majority of P-5 foreign
policy interests favored getting rid of Ghaddafi at the first
opportunity,72 and if by collective authorization, so much the better.
The subsequent apologies of several Northern and UN
international leaders, who publicly wished ex post that they had done
more, in the face of their own clear realistic capacity to act, to
interrupt or perhaps even prevent that horrific Rwanda genocidal
program, rang somewhat hollow.73 But they did lead to proposals for
an obligatory doctrine of intervention binding on states in a position
to do so, to halt ongoing or impending human rights atrocities (and
not lesser degrees of violation, however understood). Various
proposals followed in the UN system. But fairly quickly this version
of R2P was challenged by the issue of whether such intervention to
prevent human rights atrocities must only lie under some collective
exercise of authority, desirably the UN Security Council, but perhaps
as in Africa for Sierra Leone, by regional authority. These
ambiguities were debated to and fro, until the Libyan question before
the Security Council in 2011. There, the Council, acting under
Chapter VII authority and under its quasi-judicial authority,
prescribed, in finding Libyan government actions to be a threat to
international peace and security, that government’s duty under
international law to protect its citizens and refrain from causing them
deadly harm. It described that duty as Responsibility to Protect.74
Thus, this doctrine became a standing duty of state governments to
refrain from deadly harm to their citizens, enforceable by Security
Council collective authorization of outside state military intervention
under the Charter.
R2P was thus narrowed from its original unilateral intervention
72. See Barack Obama, David Cameron & Nicolas Sarkozy, Op-Ed., Libya’s
Pathway to Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/
15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html (“[A]ny deal that leaves [Ghaddafi] in power
would lead to further chaos and lawlessness. . . . Neither Europe, the region, or the
world can afford a new safe haven for extremists.”).
73. See Jason A. Edwards, The Mission of Healing: Kofi Annan’s Failed
Apology, 16 ATLANTIC J. COMM. 88, 88 (2008).
74. S.C. Res. 1973 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
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context. The issue of the critical importance of deployment in time to
prevent a human catastrophe was submerged in favor of debate and
decision by the Northern-controlled Security Council, and the risk
was added of one or more Permanent Member vetoes abrogating any
intervention, no matter how horrific the facts on the ground. It is true
that R2P has now been quasi-judicially prescribed by the Council as a
doctrinal duty on all state governments to refrain from deadly harm to
their citizens, particularly to ensure their own regime survival. But
now we see that this prescription is in danger of becoming sui generis
and attracting no precedential authority, as the Security Council both
refuses and may be unable to apply it to other similar, or worse
situations, as is now the case with Syria.75 The R2P doctrine may be
available to levy against the Assad regime, but any intervention to
prevent or mitigate the carnage on the ground against Syrian citizens
is bottled up in the narrowness of vetoes and post-Libyan
international politics. Where, even in theory, do we go from here?
VII. A FINAL PROPOSAL
I will conclude with a proposal regarding unilateral military
intervention.
In the recent Libyan situation, R2P was prescribed by the
Security Council as a duty on all states to protect their citizens from
state-sponsored harm and destruction, and its violation was invoked
by the Council as a threat to international peace and security by the
Libyan government.76 But that invocation was inextricable from the
proto-colonial narrative running through the Security Council
process. Military force was authorized against Libya to be carried out
by three ex-colonial metropolitans (Italians, British, French) of
Libyan territory when it was a colony, through Council decision
making where at least three of the P-5 states had their own longstanding foreign policy reasons for removing Ghaddafi as a national
leader.77 African initiatives for a more negotiated approach to the

75. Rieff, supra note 67.
76. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, at 1–2 (Mar. 17, 2011).
77. See Ewen MacAskill, Obama Hails Death of Muammar Gaddafi as
Foreign Policy Success, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2011, 4:13 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com
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situation were roundly rebuffed, while the Arab League gave the
Council reluctant support, which was quickly claimed in Northern
narratives to legitimize the entire operation.78
However, answering the legal challenge of those situations
where an immediate military response to an imminent human rights
catastrophe may well necessarily have to be, in the short term, a
unilateral military response (as would have likely been the case in
Rwanda), seems to involve R2P as an emerging international legal
doctrine that would give a limited unilateral legal permission to use
military force to avoid an human rights catastrophe.
The question then becomes: what changes can be made to
mitigate the racializing dangers of R2P and its projected
implementation in this regard, as between the Northern and Southern
Tiers? There is a considerable process of legal development in the
United Nations, particularly involving the General Assembly and the
Office of the Secretary-General, focused on R2P as an emerging legal
doctrine. One notable outcome is the limitation of the coverage of the
doctrine to situations involving genocide and other stated
international crimes.79 We can ask whether this limitation will help
curtail potential North to South racializing abuses under R2P, as well
as help universalize the R2P norm of preventing human rights
catastrophes in both the Northern and the Southern Tier.
But a more immediate task in this regard is to separate decisions
/world/2011/oct/20/obama-hails-death-gaddafi (“Obama . . . chalked up Libya as
another foreign policy success . . . .”); Patrick Kane, Mali, Algeria, Libya and the
New Front Line In ‘Energy Diplomacy,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013, 4:19
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/patrick-kane/mali-algeria-libya-energydiplomacy_b_2687432.html (discussing the U.K.’s increasing reliance on North
Africa’s resources); Immanuel Wallerstein, France’s Aggressive Foreign Policy,
AL
JAZEERA
(Dec.
2,
2013,
6:15
AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/12/fr
ance-foreign-policymilitaryintervention.html (arguing Africa represents France’s
opportunity to “reassume a major role” in the international relations arena).
78. Stewart Patrick, The Unruled World: The Case for Good Enough Global
Governance,
FOREIGN
AFF.
(Jan./Feb.
2014),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/140343/stewart-patrick/the-unruled-world.
79. U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional
Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011).
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about military action by Northern officials from assessments and
recognition of the imminence of a human rights catastrophe in a
particular state or situation. In other words, we must ensure the
authority of the Caroline requirement of imminence as a permissive
condition to use military force.80 This task particularly arises around
the current Security Council-related issues of, first, the “authority” of
a Security Council Chapter VII veto blocking military or other
Council action following discussion of a situation threatening
international peace and security, where there were either strong
expectations by key P-5 Members of Council authorization in which
they would play a key role, or strong international community
expectations that the Council should authorize forceful action. Much
interpretation has arisen about the “permission” given by a Council
veto for action nonetheless, by, for example, “coalitions of the
willing” organized by the strength and will of the United States for
action, such as in Iraq in 2003.
Similarly, following Kosovo and NATO action lacking Council
approval, there followed scholarly interpretations that the military
action was “illegal but legitimate.”81 The latter bifurcation, while
understandable, raised more unanswered issues about interpreting
both the UN Charter and general international law. Thus, the question
becomes that of regulating the determination of one or more P-5
members and other states who were primed for their own military
action and wished it to be collectively authorized, but it was not, and
therefore they remained determined and rationalized to carry it
through nonetheless. The companion question is that of regulating
state and public international demands for military action considered
“legitimate” to forestall a human rights tragedy, but with collective
authorization blocked by the wrong-headed veto “failure” of the
Council.

80. See John Moore, The Caroline, in 3 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2419, 2424–28 (1906); see also Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton
(Aug. 6, 1842), in 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 412 (John Bassett
Moore ed.,1906) (“[W]hile it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great
law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which
the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation.”).
81. INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOS., THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000).
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The correlative questions posit that, first, the obligation to rescue
people from human catastrophes must take legal priority over
blocking geopolitical and national governmental claims of
impossibility of meaningful response. And second, that the national
deployment of military force for other purposes beyond the above
more or less credible self-defense, not validly authorized under
international law, must be prohibited by law to the extent possible.
Such a prohibition will help mitigate the continuing danger of
Northern military intervention being justified, for other national
policy objectives, by claims of that state(s) acting to protect human
rights in a target Southern state.
To address both of these latter questions, I propose that
dedicated authority to make assessments and formally certify the
imminence of a human rights catastrophe anywhere in the world
community—and only to publicly broadcast and recognize the
imminence of such impending horrors—be lodged in the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as it is linked to
the Secretary-General. The DPKO already possesses clear capacity
towards such global monitoring, in its responsibilities to do
assessments of threatening conflicts in advance of forthcoming
Security Council discussion, in providing the Secretary-General with
necessary Council information, as well as in assessing the
requirements of implementing a peacekeeping operation authorized
by the Council.82 Part of this process already is the convoking by the
Secretary-General, independently of the Security Council and its
mandates, a “Strategic Assessment” of impending situations that
includes relevant resources and information from elsewhere in the
UN Secretariat, and which may be followed by the dispatch of special
envoys for further assessment of the situation.83 All of this strongly
suggests, especially with additional resources, that the DPKO in
conjunction with the Secretary-General, and upon his authority, could
perform the global monitoring necessary to timely and loudly
publicly proclaim the imminence of a human rights catastrophe
arising anywhere in the world community, especially a planned and
directed genocide or other R2P-stated international crimes. It further
82. Muna Ndulo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Security and
Reconstruction, 44 AKRON L. REV. 769, 770, 788 (2011); see also DEP’T OF
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & DEP’T OF FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS,
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
(2008), available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf
[hereinafter Capstone Doctrine].
83. Capstone Doctrine, supra 82, at 48.
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suggests that this Department is sufficiently independent of undue
corrupting pressures by Member states for it to do this critically
important job.
However, now the DPKO must ensure that its monitoring and
assessment function is equally extended to the Northern Tier,
following the precedent through the UN Human Rights Council of
the Universal Periodic Review of the internal human rights
conditions of all states, and the growing precedents of UN human
rights reports for conditions in the United States and elsewhere in the
North. This extension is critical to mitigate the racializing of the R2P
process.
Operationally, the DPKO under this proposal—having hopefully
learned its lessons since Rwanda—would certify, where no other
timely options through the United Nations or elsewhere could be
mobilized, that a human rights catastrophe was imminent in a
particular state and that its government was unwilling or unable to
protectively respond. This would be a loud, global certification,
perhaps analogous to a global imminent tsunami warning with the
full weight of the Secretary-General behind it. Only upon that
certification of imminence of an human rights catastrophe featuring
international crimes would any unilateral national state or states, in a
position to timely and appropriately deploy rights-protective military
force to the designated state, acquire the legal authority to so
intervene for the sole purpose of preventing or mitigating the rights
catastrophe until further international assistance could arrive
(including that authorized by the Council or a regional organization).
Such DPKO certification of imminence would only be a precondition, and itself would create no right or duty on states to
respond. However, in addition to the halting of R2P international
crimes already having been confirmed as an obligation erga omnes,
military and territorial factors plus the contextual relationship of the
unilateral actor(s) to the targeted territory and its people, would shape
the unilateral state’s duty to act to mitigate or prevent the impending
catastrophic crimes. Should that state now fail to respond where its
capacity to do so is apparent, global demands would hopefully arise
for it to immediately justify its refusing its duty to protect those
gravely endangered people on behalf of the international community.
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Those states responding would be bound by international
humanitarian law where there is military conflict, and also by
international human rights law where applicable. An important part
of their global accountability would be an assessment of the strategies
and aims of their military deployments. The latter must be tailored for
preventing a human rights catastrophe and immediately delivering the
humanitarian assistance and protection of local people directly
implied, and not for prevailing in a civil war and shaping the
governance of the country for other ends. Such military intervention
must be then tailored to withdraw once the catastrophe is prevented
and other suitable international assistance arrives.
To define the legal basis for any country using unilateral force
under this proposal requires us to recall that the legal norm of R2P
emphasizes the needs of the victims to be protected, rather than an
alleged right to intervention. We must address the issue of unilateral
military responses to claimed human rights catastrophes for at least
three reasons: (1) because of the inevitability that some states will
sometimes claim a right to do so, in relation or not to Security
Council action, and therefore the need for better international legal
regulation of this issue; (2) the history of collective authorization for
emergency human rights responses being often that of such
authorization coming, if at all, quite late to actually protect the
potential victims on the ground, or not coming at all because of P-5
conflicting politics and racializing aims blocking Security Council
action under Chapter VII, in addition to similar possible delays in
regional organizations; and (3) sometimes, as rarely and accurately
judged as possible, timely properly deployed military action even by
a single state even with its inherent violence and other risk of abuse,
is the only effective first-stage hope for threatened people in an R2P
situation.
There are already proposals being made in the legal
relationship between the Council under Chapter VII and regional
organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter for carving out
exceptions for regional military action in emergency R2P situations.84
This proposal advocates the acceleration of that process, with the
inclusion of these DPKO-certified conditions and safeguards.
I have previously suggested that regional organizations might
authorize enforcement action in emergency R2P situations under a
presumption of post hoc Security Council approval. I now expand
84. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45,
at 1457–59.
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that recommendation to the regional level, to cover presumptive
regional authorization—if it is not given timely per the DPKO
certification of imminence—for a single or a few states in a position
for an immediate properly-deployed military response for R2P
prevention. They would exercise their duty to unilaterally act to
prevent a criminal catastrophe. The burden would be, first, on the
regional organization to disown, if it wishes, the unilateral R2P
protective mission, and then on the Security Council. I suggest that
disowning such actions that are uniquely triggered by DPKO
certifications of imminence, that are publicly and properly deployed
for only that purpose, and whose deployment quickly includes
publicized goals, arrangements, and timetables for military action and
then withdrawal from the territory after averting or mitigating a
catastrophe, would rarely happen. Thus, the legal basis for unilateral
action would primarily rest on the emerging authority of regional
organizations to order enforcement actions only in emergency R2P
situations, and the implied regional authorization to those unilateral
state actors deploying military force subsequent to DPKO
certifications of imminence. Any implied Security Council approval
post hoc would only support that legality.
More risky arguments might also be made on the legality of this
emergency, unilateral R2P action based on General Assembly or
other appropriate process of limited re-interpretation of Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter that this unilateral use of force against a designated
state for this R2P purpose, and only under these DPKO-certified
conditions and safeguards, presumptively does not constitute a threat
to the territorial integrity or the political independence of the
intervened-in state. Such tightly defined action upholds Charter
human rights obligations, constitutes a valid emergency exception
absent Security Council action not otherwise addressed by the
Charter, and therefore constitutes a lawful use of limited unilateral
force under the UN Charter. Professor D’Amato has shown how the
Charter travaux support such an interpretation of Article 2(4).85

85. Anthony D’Amato, The Meaning of Article 2(4) in the U.N. Charter 15
(Northwestern Pub. Law and Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 13-30, 2013),
available at http://ssrn.comabstract=2321806. See also Robert F. Turner,
International Law Studies, Vol.67, Chapter III, State Sovereignty, International
Law, and the Use of Force in Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern
World 48, 65; Barry M. Benjamin, "Unilateral Humanitarian Interventions:
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All in all, this proposed legal basis for unilateral R2P DPKOcertified emergency military intervention, and for regional
organizations authorizing enforcement action for the same purpose,
represents more desirable international community policy, than the
current Northern-led debates on the authority to act militarily
conferred by a Security Council veto-refusal of Chapter VII decisions
to authorize protective military action, and than the dilemma for
international lawyers following Kosovo of designating emergency
catastrophe-mitigating regional action absent Council authorization
as “illegal but legitimate.”
Again, the DPKO and the Secretary General must be equally
prepared and willing to give such global certifications of imminence
to situations in the Northern Tier where its timely assessment
requires. If no outside military forces respond, the threatened people
within a Northern state will at least gain some added local protection,
plus other possible globally mobilized strategies of non-military
intervention, from this special global spotlight focused on their
oppression.
CONCLUSION
It is an open question whether international law will develop to
only bless current patterns of power regarding North to South
practices of intervention, or whether better international law will
resolve this challenge through a less racialized process. The power of
human rights is hopeful, but insufficient without more incorporation
of the lessons of the Decolonization Movement, and without R2P
successfully emerging as a non-racialized norm of protection in
imminently catastrophic situations. The United Nations, in spite of
the Security Council in its current process, must play an important,
safeguarding role. I always hold out hope for better international
law.
Thank you.
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